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 The 2011 
constitutional 
reform in Morocco: 
more flaws than 
merits 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the speech given to both Houses of 
Parliament on 11 October 2013 during the first 
parliamentary session, King Mohammed VI 
said that the “Moroccan democratic model” 
was “a precursor in the region as well as on 
the continental level.”1 Similarly, with the 
purpose of stressing the “democratic 
exceptionalism”2 of the country, the new 
government, led by Abdeilah Benkirane,3 often 
emphasised that Morocco represents a “third 
way” compared to countries such as Tunisia, 
Libya or Egypt since it “…has not embarked on 
a limited process of reform from the top, 
driven and controlled by the King. Nor has it 
experienced a revolution brought about by 
angry citizens rising up against the regime. 
Rather, it has chosen an alternate path based 
on a genuine partnership between the King 
and the PJD (Parti de la justice et du 
développement) that promises to bring about 
more far-reaching reform than what the 
palace alone would grant, without the 
                                               
*
 Post-doctoral Research Fellow in Comparative 
Public Law at the University of Bologna’s School of 
Law; Researcher at the Center for Constitutional 
Studies and Democratic Development (CCSDD). 
1 The speech is available, along with all other official 
speeches of the Sovereign, online at: 
http://www.maroc.ma/PortailInst/Fr/. 
2 See L. Lalami (2011), “The Moroccan ‘Exception’”. 
The Nation, 24 August, 
http://www.thenation.com/article/162967/moroccan-
exception. 
3 Leader of the Parti de la justice et du développement 
(PJD), the moderate Islamic party which won the 
November 2011 elections. 
disruption caused by uncontrolled popular 
upheaval.”4 
 
It should not be at all surprising that the 
regime and the new Government consider 
Morocco a “democratic model” or a “third 
way.” After all, they are referring to their own 
country. What is harder to understand is that 
when discussing the Arab uprisings, even 
prominent Western political leaders, 
representatives of the European Union 
institutions and the mainstream media (when 
they do not forget about Morocco) often tend 
to praise the process of democratic reform 
carried out by Mohammed VI. For example, on 
12 September 2012, Hillary Clinton, former US 
Secretary of State, said, “in many ways, the 
United States looks to Morocco to be a leader 
and a model […] On political reform, we have 
all seen remarkable changes taking place 
across North Africa and the Middle East. I 
commend Morocco and your government for 
your efforts to stay ahead of these changes by 
holding free and fair elections, empowering 
the elected parliament, taking other steps to 
ensure that the government reflects the will of 
the people.”5 Similarly, former French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy sang the praises of 
the process that led to the adoption of the 
new 2011 Constitution: “King Mohammed VI 
has shown the path towards a profound, 
peaceful and modern transformation of 
Moroccan institutions and society […] France 
fully supports this exemplary process.”6 
Interestingly enough, even at the European 
Union level the constitutional reform that took 
place in Morocco was considered an 
extremely positive step taken by the country, 
as well as a means to strengthen the 
cooperation between the EU and Morocco. 
Indeed, according to the High Representative 
                                               
4 As highlighted by M. Ottaway (2012), Morocco: Can 
the Third Way Succeed? Carnegie Endowment, 31 July, 
www.carnegieendowment.org. 
5 H. Clinton (2012), “Remarks at the Opening Plenary of 
the US-Morocco Strategic Dialogue”. US Department of 
State, 13 September, 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/09/197711.htm. 
6 Le monde (2011), “La France salue les réformes 
annoncées par le roi du Maroc”. 18 June, 
http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2011/06/18/la-
france-salue-les-reformes-annoncees-par-le-roi-du-
maroc_1538011_3212.html. 
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Catherine Ashton, this reform “constitute[s] a 
significant response to the legitimate 
aspirations of the Moroccan people and [is] 
consistent with Morocco’s Advanced Status 
with the EU.”7 When it comes to the media, it 
is worth noting that following the ratification 
of the 2011 Constitution, The New York Times 
headlined: “All Hail the (Democratic) King.”8 
Even sections of the academic literature have 
commended the constitutional reform carried 
out by the Moroccan Sovereign.9 
 
In this paper I argue against the 
aforementioned idea, according to which 
Morocco should be considered a model in the 
region, and in particular I show that the 
constitution-making process, the 2011 
Constitution and its subsequent 
implementation have more flaws than merits.  
 
Accordingly, this paper proceeds in five steps. 
First of all, I examine the reaction of the 
regime to the upheavals that broke out in the 
country after 20 February 2011. Secondly, I 
analyse the process of constitution-making, 
showing its main strengths and weaknesses, 
and comparing it with other constituent 
processes that took place in the region 
following the Arab uprisings. In the third 
section, I highlight the most significant 
elements of continuity and discontinuity with 
the previous 1996 Constitution. The fourth 
                                               
7http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/sites/default/files/LCIL/docu
ments/arabspring/Morocco_6_Joint%20_Statement_HR
_and_Commisssioner.pdf. On the relations between the 
EU and Morocco see F. Bicchi (2010), “The Impact of 
the ENP on EU-North Africa Relations: The Good, the 
Bad and the Ugly”, in R.G. Whitman and S. Wolff 
(eds.), The European Neighbourhood Policy in 
Perspective. Context, Implementation and Impact, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
8 A. Charai and J. Braude (2011), “All Hail the 
(Democratic) King”. The New York Times, 11 July, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/12/opinion/12Charai.h
tml?_r=0. 
9 See, in particular, A. Bouachik, M. Degoffe and C. 
Saint-Prot (eds.) (2012), “La Constitution marocaine de 
2011: Lectures croisées”. Publications de la Revue 
marocaine d’administration locale et de développement, 
Série “Thèmes actuels”, no. 77; C. Saint-Prot and F. 
Rouvillois (eds.) (2013), L’exception marocaine. Paris: 
Ellipses. 
section deals with the process of 
implementation: specifically, I show that this 
process is proceeding quite slowly and that in 
some cases ordinary legislation is in contrast 
with the new Constitution and international 
human rights treaties. Moreover, I discuss the 
role that the judiciary and the Constitutional 
Court can play in the implementation and 
interpretation of the Constitution. Finally, I 
draw some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. A New Constitution in Response to the 
Uprisings 
 
Before the 2011 Constitution, Morocco had 
adopted five Constitutions (in 1962, 1970, 
1972, 1992 and 1996); all entered into force 
under the reign of Hassan II, the father of 
Mohammed VI. Although the 1992 and 1996 
Constitutions introduced some democratic 
novelties (such as the Constitutional Council, 
the Economic and Social Council and stronger 
protection of fundamental rights), the legal 
system represented an important tool for 
Hassan II to exercise his authoritarian power 
over the country. In fact, all five Constitutions 
granted him almost unlimited powers. In 
particular, Article 19 gave him both secular 
and spiritual powers: he was both the head of 
State, the supreme representative of the 
nation, and the “Amir Al Mouminine” – that is, 
the “Commander of the Faithful.” 
 
The need to adopt a new Constitution had 
become apparent since Mohammed VI came 
to the throne in 1999. It was specifically the 
Mouvement de Revendication d’une 
Constitution Démocratique, made up 
principally of members of left-wing parties, 
that pushed for the adoption of a new 
Constitution that would provide greater 
protection of fundamental rights, a more 
robust recognition of the pluralist nature of 
Moroccan identity, and a far-reaching reform 
of the system of distributing political power. 
 
 There appear to be two main reasons why, 
despite a rather intense debate on this issue, 
the 1996 constitutional reform was not 
implemented until after the King’s 9 March 
2011 speech, when he announced to the 
country his decision to complete a “global 
constitutional reform.” The first reason results 
from the fact that the adoption of a new 
Constitution did not represent a priority for 
the major parties represented in Parliament; 
in fact, these parties considered the 1996 
Constitution to be satisfactory, “and that what 
needed to be changed was not the 
Constitution, but practices; compliance with 
the [then-] Constitution was all that was 
needed.”10  
 
The second and more important reason 
resulted from the fact that the Sovereign did 
not have any interest in making amendments 
to the 1996 Constitution, nor in adopting a 
new one when he was not under any political 
pressure to do so.11 It was therefore not 
particularly surprising that Mohammed VI had 
no intention of debating constitutional reform. 
Besides, history has demonstrated that 
democratic reforms are only implemented in 
Morocco when the Monarchy is put under 
significant pressure (from the army, the 
parties, the population or the international 
community), and it is for this reason that the 
most prevalent expression used in the 
literature is “top-down democratisation.”12  
 
The Sovereign’s decision on 9 March 2011 to 
announce a far-reaching reform of the 
Constitution undoubtedly provides further 
confirmation of this tendency. In fact, through 
the enactment of a new Constitution, 
Mohammed VI wanted to appease public 
dissatisfaction and calm down the protests 
that had started to break out in Morocco after 
20 February 2011: the date from which the 
eponymous “Mouvement du 20 Février” took 
its name. This movement which largely 
composed of young people, specifically 
                                               
10 L. Storm (2007), Democratization in Morocco: The 
Political Elite and Struggles for Power in the Post-
Independence State. London: Routledge, p. 157. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
denounced the systematic and endemic 
corruption, the high cost of basic products, 
low wages and increasing poverty; it also 
called for greater social justice, free access to 
health care, greater employment 
opportunities and the right to housing. Young 
Moroccans also hoped for the achievement of 
profound and radical constitutional and 
political reforms, the construction of a State 
based on the rule of law, and a free and 
independent legal system in order to enable 
the country to become a parliamentary 
monarchy.13 It should be noted that the 
regime managed to keep the protest 
movements under control, also because it was 
able in many ways to provide tangible 
responses extremely quickly. In fact, the King’s 
announcement of constitutional reform on 9 
March 2011 occurred less than three weeks 
after the first protests.  
 
 
3. The Constitution-Making Process 
 
On 9 March 2011, under the pretext of 
pursuing the process of an “advanced 
regionalization system,”14 and without 
mentioning the 20 February Movement, 
Mohammed VI gave a genuine “constituent 
speech,” in which he asserted the “seven key 
elements” on which the constitutional reform 
was to be based: 1) a guarantee of the 
pluralist nature of Moroccan identity, 
including the Amazigh component; 2) 
consolidation of the rule of law, the promotion 
and expansion of the scope of fundamental 
rights, and the guarantee of their exercise; 3) a 
guarantee of the independence of the 
judiciary and reinforcement of the powers of 
the Constitutional Council; 4) consolidation of 
the principle of the separation of powers 
through the transfer of new powers to 
Parliament, the appointment as Prime 
Minister of a member of the party obtaining 
the largest number of votes in elections, and 
the reinforcement of the Prime Minister’s 
                                               
13  I. Fernández Molina (2011), “The Monarchy vs. the 
20 February Movement: Who Holds the Reins of 
Political Change in Morocco?” Mediterranean Politics, 
16(3), pp. 436-37. 
14 See section 4.1. 
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status as the head of the executive branch; 5) 
consolidation of the role of political parties 
within a pluralist system, and reinforcement of 
the roles of the parliamentary opposition and 
civil society; 6) a bolstering of mechanisms 
intended to guarantee moral integrity in public 
life to favour responsible conduct within 
public office; and 7) a guarantee of the 
institutions concerning good governance, 
human rights and the protection of freedoms. 
 
On 10 March, the day after the speech was 
delivered, the King appointed an ad hoc body, 
the Consultative Commission on Constitutional 
Reform, which was charged with the task of 
preparing a new draft Constitution. The 
Commission was chaired by Abdellatif 
Mennouni, a renowned constitutionalist and 
former member of the Constitutional Council, 
and was composed of 18 members, all 
appointed by the King, most of whom were 
university professors and activists in  human 
rights associations. It should be stressed that, 
with the exception of Rajae Mekkaoui,15 the 
Commission lacked any religious members or 
Ouléma, thereby highlighting the path towards 
secularisation that the new Constitution was 
intended to pursue. 
 
In parallel with the appointment of the 
Commission, Mohammed VI ordered the 
establishment of a “Political Mechanism 
Accompanying the Constitutional Reform,” 
consisting of representatives of political 
parties and the trade unions and led by his 
advisor, Mohammed Moatassim, a university 
professor and expert in constitutional law. 
This mechanism was expected to facilitate 
dialogue and concerted action between the 
various political actors, and was intended to 
operate as a channel for communication 
between the Commission and the political 
forces and trade unions. 
 
All of the political and social organisations 
within the country, including the 20 February 
                                               
15 A member of the High Council of the Ouléma. 
Movement, were invited to submit proposed 
constitutional amendments to the 
Commission, which also organised 
approximately a hundred meetings in order to 
enable the representatives of the 
organisations to present their requests orally. 
Only a small number of minority left-wing 
parties failed to reply to the Commission’s 
invitation, along with the 20 February 
Movement, which complained that the 
Commission lacked democratic legitimacy and 
the Constitution was being granted as an act 
of “largesse.”  
 
It should be pointed out that the requests 
presented by the political and social 
organisations were largely of the same tone as 
the “constituent speech” delivered on 9 March 
2011. Indeed, most of the proposals were 
already stated in the King’s speech, and 
therefore they did not introduce any 
significant novelty in the debate.16 Therefore, 
the practical consequence was that the 
Commission merely wrote the text of a 
Constitution whose content had been 
“dictated” directly by Mohammed VI. Driss 
Maghraoui has rightly stressed the fact that 
the political parties’ passive reaction was an 
excellent example of their “domestication”17 
by the King, thus confirming the “politics of 
consensus” that has been characterising 
Morocco for many years. According to this 
notion, the role and the absolute powers of 
the King are not the object of discussion and 
dissent among the parties. The latter, 
regardless of their ideological orientations, 
“seem comfortable with not taking the 
initiative and leaving the palace full control of 
                                               
16 There were some exceptions, such as the request 
presented by the leftist Vanguard Party to eliminate the 
“old” Art. 19 of the Constitution, which granted 
unlimited powers to the King (see A. Tourabi (2011), 
Constitutional Reform in Morocco: Reform in Times of 
Revolution. November, p. 6, http://www.arab-
reform.net/sites/default/files/Morocco_EN.pdf). 
17 D. Maghraoui (2013), “Constitutional reforms in 
Morocco: Between Consensus and Subaltern Politics”. 
North Africa’s Arab Spring, G. Joffé (ed.). London: 
Routledge, p. 182. 
 the political game and orientations of the 
country.”18 
 
The work of the Commission, the meetings of 
which were not open to the public, was 
completed with particular speed, given that in 
his speech the King had stated that he 
expected an initial report to be presented to 
him before the end of June. The Commission 
met with the political parties and trade unions 
on 7 June 2011; on that occasion, Commission 
President Mennouni made an oral 
presentation on the key features of the 
reform, although he did not distribute a 
written version of the new text of the 
Constitution. This led several political parties 
and trade unions to walk out of the meeting as 
a sign of protest. Subsequently, on 10 June, 
Mennouni presented the plan for 
constitutional reform to Mohammed VI, whilst 
Moatassim informed the Sovereign of the 
decisions adopted by the Political Mechanism 
accompanying the Constitutional Reform. 
Most political parties and trade unions were 
strongly critical of the fact that they had only 
received a written draft of the Constitution 
the day before the King’s speech to the nation 
(17 June), when he set out the key objectives 
of the reform and invited the population to 
participate in a constitutional referendum to 
be held on 1 July, urging them to approve the 
new text.19   
 
The referendum result was a success for 
Mohammed VI, since the new Constitution 
was approved by 98% of those who voted. 
With some rare exceptions (such as the 20 
February Movement), political parties, trade 
unions and social organisations invited the 
population to vote “yes” in that consultation. 
The turnout of 73.5% may be read in 
diametrically opposed terms depending upon 
one’s point of view: whilst on one hand, it is 
double the rate registered in the 2007 
parliamentary elections (which was a meagre 
                                               
18 D. Maghraoui (2013), op. cit., p. 182. 
19
 It also appears that Moatassim had made certain 
changes to the draft Constitution a few hours before the 
King’s speech on 17 June, and that as late as the day 
before the referendum, three articles from the new 
Constitution were “furtively corrected” (I. Fernández 
Molina (2011), op. cit., p. 439). 
37%), it did nonetheless represent the lowest 
rate in the history of the constitutional 
referendums held in the country, being more 
than 11 percentage points lower than the 
1996 consultation.20  
 
3.1. Strengths and Weaknesses of the 
Constituent Process  
 
In the following paragraphs I identify the main 
strengths and weaknesses of the Moroccan 
constitutional process, and I will also make 
some references to the constitution-making 
processes in the other neighbouring countries 
involved in the Arab uprisings. 
 
The Lack of a Democratically Elected 
Constituent Assembly 
 
The Moroccan constitutional process was 
heavily criticised by several political parties, as 
well as by social organisations and in a section 
of the academic literature. The principal 
objection, as was already asserted, regarded 
the lack of democratic legitimacy of the 
Commission on Constitutional Reform, since it 
had been appointed entirely by the Sovereign. 
Once again, in fact, requests to elect a 
constituent assembly were disregarded. It 
should be pointed out that some political 
parties, trade unions and associations had 
been calling for the election of a constituent 
assembly since the 1962 Constitution. The 
Union Nationale des Forces Populaires, the 
Parti Communiste Marocain, the Parti 
Démocratique Constitutionnel and the trade 
union Union Marocaine du Travail rejected 
that Constitution because it was not the 
outcome of a constituent assembly but came 
directly from the palace. The difficulties, which 
were practically insurmountable, in electing a 
body of that type may be summarised 
succinctly by a commentator writing in 1963: 
“The Constituent Assembly is vested with 
supreme power and, in Morocco, such 
supreme power lies with the King alone. This 
                                               
20 See the data reported by J. Montabes Pereira and M.A. 
Parejo Fernández (1999), “Morocco”. Elections in 
Africa: A Data Handbook, D. Nohlen, M. Krennerich, B. 
Thibaut (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 
632-33. 
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power of His Majesty was not challenged even 
prior to the Protectorate” (emphasis added).21  
 
Fifty years later, in 2011, Mohammed VI 
continued to pursue this tradition of a “roi 
constituant” (“constituent King”);22 in fact, it 
was he who decided to engage in a far-
reaching constitutional reform, to identify the 
“key elements” on which that reform was to 
be based, to appoint the Commission on 
Constitutional Reform, and finally to grant his 
approval of the draft presented to him by 
Mennouni. The King therefore had the first 
and the last word. Consequently, down to the 
present day, “octroyées” Constitutions23 have 
been a constant feature of Moroccan history. 
 
The lack of a democratically elected 
constituent assembly represents one of the 
main differences compared to the 
constitution-making processes taking place in 
neighbouring countries involved in the Arab 
uprisings. For example, in Tunisia, the 217 
members of the National Constituent 
Assembly were elected by the people in 
October 2011 on the basis of a closed-list and 
a  proportional representation electoral 
system. The Assembly works both as an 
interim legislature and constitution-making 
body. In Egypt, the Constitution adopted in 
December 2012 was drafted by a 100-member 
Constituent Assembly elected by the 
Parliament. It should be noted, however, that 
the Assembly did not have a quiet life, since its 
work was suspended by a judgment of the 
                                               
21 A.R. Guédira (1963), “Une constituante ni nécessaire 
ni possible”. Confluent, 27, January, p. 67, cited in M. 
Tozy (1999), Monarchie et Islam politique au Maroc. 
Paris: Press de Sciences Po, pp. 90-91. 
22 B. Cubertafond (2011), “La transition marocaine après 
le printemps arabe et la nouvelle Constitution”. Les 
Etudes et Essais du Centre Jacque Berque, no. 5, Rabat, 
November, p. 3, 
http://www.cjb.ma/images/stories/publications/Cubertaf
ond_EE_5.pdf 
23 In the past, some members of the opposition parties 
even defined it as “Constitution mon bon plaisir” (M. 
Rousset, “L’évolution constitutionnelle du Maroc de 
Mohammed V à Mohammed VI”, in A. Bouachik, M. 
Degoffe, C. Saint-Prot (2012), op. cit., p. 31). 
Supreme Administrative Court in April 2012.24 
Moreover, many of its non-Islamist members 
withdrew from the Assembly, accusing 
representatives of Islamist forces of doing 
their best to draft a constitution aimed at 
turning Egypt into a radical Islamist state.25 In 
Libya, the constituent assembly that is 
scheduled to be elected on 20 February 2014, 
will consist of 60 members so that each of the 
three traditional provinces (Cyrenaica, Fezzan 
and Tripolitania) is equally represented. The 
registration for candidates of the Assembly 
started at the beginning of October 2013.26 
 
Democratic Referendum or (more likely) 
Authoritarian Plebiscite? 
 
An argument that may be proposed in support 
of the position that the 2011 Moroccan 
Constitution did not result from an act of 
“largesse” flows from the fact that it was 
ratified – as was the case in Egypt27 and 
                                               
24 S. Mourad (2012), “Court ruling brings Egypt’s 
constitutional crisis to climax”. Ahram Online, 10 April, 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentPrint/1/0/38983
/Egypt/0/Court-ruling-brings-Egypts-constitutional-
crisis-t.aspx 
25 A. Aboul Enein (2012), “More withdraw from 
Constituent Assumbly”. Daily News Egypt, November 
18, http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2012/11/18/more-
withdraw-from-constituent-assembly/. It should be 
noted, however, that on 8 July 2013, following President 
Mohamed Morsi’s removal from office, Egypt’s Interim 
President, Adli Mansour, issued a new constitutional 
declaration that suspended the 2012 Constitution and 
laid out a three-step process for amending it. First, a 10-
member technical committee was given the task of 
proposing amendments to the 2012 Constitution. 
Second, a 50-member constituent assembly will have 
two months to debate the proposed changes. Finally, a 
referendum will be organised to ratify the new 
Constitution. 
26 A. Elumami (2013), “Constitutional assembly 
candidates being registered – deadline extended till end 
of November”. Libya Herald, 21 October, 
http://www.libyaherald.com/2013/10/21/44941/#axzz2ii
rRRoHN 
27 The constitutional referendum was held in two rounds, 
on 15 and 22 December 2012. The new Constitution was 
approved by 63.8% of those who voted. However, it 
should be pointed out that “[…] only 32.9% of eligible 
voters cast their ballots in the elections and most 
importantly the new constitution was approved with the 
support of 20.9% of eligible voters. Only 17.1 million 
 potentially even in Tunisia28 – by popular 
referendum.29 However, this argument is 
decidedly weak, above all in the light of the 
fact that during the two weeks running up to 
the consultation, the Monarchy made every 
effort to promote the reform and strongly 
restricted the space available to those (such as 
the representatives of the 20 February 
Movement) who urged a boycott of the vote. 
Moreover, on election day, reports of fraud 
were reported all over the country. Thus, 
there was never going to be any doubt over 
the referendum result. It is evident, then, that 
as happened in the past, this consultation was 
much more like an authoritarian plebiscite 
than a democratic referendum.30 Indeed, 
“[autocratic] referenda [are] motivated more 
by a desire to legitimise the autocrat’s control 
of a polity than to allow the citizens to render 
a considered verdict on the constitution.”31 
 
A Very Short Constitution-Making Period 
 
Another criticism that has been made is that 
the constitutional process was too short. It 
took just a little over three months to prepare 
the draft Constitution and to consult with the 
                                                                           
people out of nearly 52 million registered voters in 
Egypt participated. […] Demographically, only 10.9 
million Egyptians voted yes to approve the new 
constitution. This is not even a quarter of the population 
in a country of nearly 82 million people. This means that 
about 13.3% of the Egyptian population supported the 
new constitution.” See M.D. Nazemroaya (2013), 
Egypt’s Constitutional Referendum: Did President 
Morsi Hijack Democracy? Global Research: Centre for 
Research on Globalization, July 5, 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/statistically-examining-
cairos-constitutional-referendum-did-morsi-hijack-
democracy/5320067 
28 The Constitution has to be approved by a two-thirds 
majority of the Constituent Assembly; if it fails that 
majority, the Constitution will be submitted for a public 
referendum. 
29 The Constitution in Tunisia was approved by the 
country’s parliament in January 2014 and an election 
will be held later on during the year. 
30 See the “referendums” that took place before the 
promulgation of the 1962, 1970, 1972, 1992 and 1996 
Constitutions. 
31 J. Blount (2011), “Participation in Constitutional 
Design”. Comparative Constitutional Law, T. Ginsburg, 
R. Dixon (eds.). Cheltenham-Northampton: Edward 
Elgar, p. 50. On the differences between authoritarian 
plebiscites and democratic referendums, see also G. de 
Vergottini (2011), Diritto costituzionale comparato. 
Padua: Cedam, pp. 244-48. 
representatives of political parties and trade 
unions. Similar criticisms were made against 
the constitution-writing process in Egypt, 
where former President Morsi confirmed the 
decision made by the Supreme Council of 
Armed Forces (SCAF) to impose a six-month 
timeframe for the entire constitution-drafting 
process. Indeed, Morsi pushed ahead to get 
the constitution ratified by December 2012: 
“[I]n the end, meeting the deadline became 
one of the process’ essential goals, regardless 
of what it meant for the prospects for national 
unity.”32 Therefore, the Moroccan and 
Egyptian cases seem to confirm that very rapid 
constitution-making periods are typical of 
“non-democracies.”33 
 
In Tunisia, the National Constituent Assembly 
met for the first time on 22 November 2011, 
and as of the date of this paper, the 
Constitution has not yet been adopted. (see 
footnote 29 supra).  
 
The Lack of Transparency 
 
A further objection addressed the lack of 
transparency within the work of the 
Commission, since its meetings were not open 
to the public. It should be specified that 
secrecy in itself is not an absolute evil; on the 
contrary: 
  
“[D]ebates in front of an audience tend to 
generate rhetorical overbidding and heated 
passions that are incompatible with the 
kind of close and calm scrutiny that ought 
to be the rule when one is adopting 
provisions for the indefinite future. By 
denying the public admission to the 
proceedings and by keeping the debates 
secret until the final document has been 
adopted, one creates conditions for 
                                               
32 Z. Al-Ali (2012), “The New Egyptian Constitution: 
An Initial Assessment of its Merits and Flaws”. Open 
Democracy, 26 December, 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/zaid-al-ali/new-
egyptian-constitution-initial-assessment-of-its-merits-
and-flaws 
33 J. Blount, Z. Elkins and T. Ginsburg (2012), “Does the 
Process of Constitution-making Matter?” Comparative 
Constitutional Design, T. Ginsburg (ed.). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, p. 41. 
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rational discussion that are less likely to 
prevail in the presence of an audience.”34 
 
However, initial secrecy should be offset by 
subsequent publicity – for example, in the 
form of discussions in a plenary assembly. In 
fact, with total secrecy, “partisan interests and 
logrolling come to the forefront”.35 In this 
sense, the Spanish constitutional process (of 
the 1980s) was considered by Jon Elster as one 
that came closest to striking an “optimal 
balance” between secrecy and publicity.36 In 
Morocco, on the contrary, as noted above, the 
second public stage was entirely lacking.  
 
The Moroccan case is in sharp contrast with 
what happened in Tunisia, where the 
constitutional committee chairs invited civil 
society groups, international advisors and 
legal scholars to their meetings. Moreover, the 
Constituent Assembly released draft texts as 
they were completed, and its members had 
the chance to consult and receive feedback 
from their constituencies.37 The transparency 
                                               
34 J. Elster (2006), “Legislatures as Constituent 
Assemblies”. The Least Examined Branch. The Role of 
Legislatures in the Constitutional State, R.W. Bauman 
and T. Kahana (eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, p. 191. 
35 J. Elster (1995), “Forces and Mechanisms in the 
Constitution-making Process”. Duke Law Journal, 45, p. 
395. With regard to this aspect, two diametrically 
opposed processes of constitution-making are the 1787 
Federal Convention in Philadelphia (which met in 
complete secrecy) and the 1789 French Constituent 
Assembly (which was fully public). On this point, see J. 
Elster (2000), “Arguing and Bargaining in Two 
Constituent Assemblies”. University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of Constitutional Law, 2(2), p. 345 ff. 
36 J. Elster (1995), cit., p. 395. Initially, in fact, the 
Constitutional Affairs and Public Freedoms Committee 
appointed a Ponencia (comprised of seven members 
from the main political parties) with the task of drawing 
up a draft Constitution, and the decisions of this limited 
body were taken in secret. The draft Constitution was 
only subsequently presented to the Cortes and discussed 
publicly in both Houses of Parliament (see J. de Esteban 
(1989), “El proceso constituyente español, 1977-1978”. 
La transicción democratica española, J.F. Tezanos, R. 
Cortarelo and A. de Blas (eds.). Madrid: Editorial 
sistema, p. 275 ff.). 
37 See D. Pickard (2012), Lessons from Constitution-
making in Tunisia. Atlantic Council, December, 
and openness of the Tunisian constitutional 
process is also evident in the fact that even 
external actors played a role in this process: 
for example, on 3 June 2013, the Speaker of 
the National Constituent Assembly requested 
the opinion of the Venice Commission on the 
final draft of the Constitution of Tunisia. The 
observations of the Commission were made 
public on 17 July 2013. 38  
 
Higher Level of Participation by Political 
Parties and Social Organisations 
 
The level of participation by political parties, 
trade unions and social organisations in the 
drafting of the Constitution was undoubtedly 
higher compared to the past. In fact, for a very 
long period of time, the principal (if not only) 
instrument available to the parties in order to 
propose constitutional amendments to the 
King was to send him “memoranda.” This 
practice “affirmed the domination and 
authority of the King in the process of drafting 
the constitutional text, but at the same time it 
allowed other parties to get involved in the 
process and add their remarks and demands 
to the reform agenda.”39 On the contrary, 
while adopting the 2011 Constitution, parties 
and associations were also given the 
opportunity of meeting with members of the 
Commission on Constitutional Reform and to 
present their requests orally, whilst dialogue 
and concerted action were also promoted by 
the presence of the Political Mechanism 
Accompanying the Constitutional Reform.40   
                                                                           
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/files/publication_
pdfs/403/mec121213tunisia.pdf 
38 The observations of the Venice Commission (Venice 
Commission (2013), “Observations on the final draft 
constitution of the Republic of Tunisia”. Council of 
Europe, 17 July) are available online at: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=C
DL(2013)034-e  
39 A. Tourabi (2011), op. cit., p. 3; see also M. Tozy 
(1999), op. cit., pp. 101-102. 
40 However, it should be noted that given the strong tie 
between the King and Moatassim (head of the Political 
Mechanism), this body was de facto also assigned the 
task of identifying what was “politically acceptable to 
the palace and what was not” (M. Rousset (2012), 
“L’interprétation des pouvoirs du roi dans la nouvelle 
  
Considered overall, the 2011 Moroccan 
constituent process was characterised by a 
greater degree of democracy than in the past, 
particularly when it comes to the participation 
of political parties and social organisations in 
the process. However, some major democratic 
deficits remain: the Constitution continues to 
be a “concession” made by the Sovereign,41 
the constitutional referendum was in reality 
much more similar to an authoritarian 
plebiscite, and the work of the Commission 
was too rapid and characterised by a lack of 
transparency. Moreover, compared to other 
constitution-making processes in the region 
(in particular, Tunisia’s),42 the Moroccan 
constituent process seems in many ways less 
democratic. 
 
 
4. The 2011 Constitution 
 
The new Constitution – promulgated by 
Mohammed VI through dahir (royal decree) 
no. 1-11-91 of 29 July 2011 – is characterised 
by discontinuity and continuity with the 
previous Constitution, which came into force 
in 1996 under Hassan II.43 In fact, as shown 
below, although it introduced some relevant 
                                                                           
Constitution”. La Constitution marocaine de 2011: 
Analyses et commentaires, Centre d’Études 
Internationales (eds.). Paris: L.G.D.J., p. 60). 
41 It should be noted that part of the literature has praised 
the constituent procedure adopted in Morocco, defining 
the process of drafting the Constitution through a 
constituent assembly as “cumbersome, ineffective and 
disappointing” (F. Rouvillois (2012), “Réflexions sur la 
monarchie démocratique à la marocaine”, in A. 
Bouachik, M. Degoffe, C. Saint-Prot (eds.), op. cit., p. 
67). 
42 The 2012 Egyptian constitution-making process was 
more democratic compared to the country’s past (e.g., 
for the first time, the Constitution was drafted by an 
elected body, as stressed by Z. Al-Ali (2012), op. cit.), 
but it was still characterised by many flaws. 
43 For a commentary on the new Constitution, in addition 
to the volumes mentioned in footnote no. 9, see Centre 
d’Études Internationales (eds.) (2012), op. cit.; 
International IDEA (2012), The 2011 Moroccan 
Constitution: A Critical Analysis. Stockholm: 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance; F. Biagi (2012), “La Monarchia nella 
Costituzione del Marocco del 2011”. Percorsi 
costituzionali, 3, p. 415 ff. 
democratic novelties, it continues to grant the 
King near absolute powers. 
 
4.1. Between Discontinuity… 
 
As regards the recognition and protection of 
fundamental rights, it should be pointed out 
that the preamble states that the international 
conventions ratified by Morocco shall take 
precedence over domestic law, and that 
national legislation must consequently be 
brought into line with the former. Particular 
emphasis is also given to equality between 
men and women, thus pursuing the spirit of 
the 2004 reform of the Family Code 
(“Moudawana”).44 Moreover, Article 5 of the 
Constitution recognizes Amazigh as an official 
State language alongside Arabic, thus 
accepting the long-standing claim of the 
Berber peoples. As will be discussed below, it 
is also important to stress that in addition to 
the ex ante review (already provided under 
the previous Constitution), the new 
Constitution introduced the ex post 
constitutional review. 
 
The 2011 Constitution also introduced 
significant novelties in relation to the 
horizontal separation of powers. Indeed, the 
Constitution reinforces the powers of the 
executive, the legislature and the judiciary, 
and it guarantees greater independence and 
autonomy to each of them. The Government is 
no longer responsible to the King and to 
Parliament, but exclusively toward Parliament. 
Moreover, whilst under the previous 
Constitution the Council of Government had 
no official recognition and was limited to the 
exercise of “a function involving the 
preparation of decisions adopted by the 
                                               
44 It should be pointed out that the preamble of the 
Constitution enshrines the supremacy of international 
conventions, but “within the framework of the 
provisions of the Constitution, the laws of the Kingdom, 
and respect for its immutable national identity” 
(emphasis added). Similarly, Article 19 of the 
Constitution subjects the principle of equal rights for 
men and women to compliance with the “provisions of 
the Constitution and […] the immutable values and the 
laws of the Realm” (emphasis added). In both cases, it is 
evident that the reference made by the Constitution 
pertains to the Islamic religion. On this issue, see section 
5.2. 
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Council of Ministers,”45 the new Constitution 
expressly recognizes its status and vests it with 
important functions. Furthermore, while in the 
past the Prime Minister was appointed at the 
discretion of the King, the 2011 Constitution 
states that the Sovereign shall appoint the 
head of Government from the party that wins 
the most seats in the elections to the House of 
Representatives.46 As far as the legislature is 
concerned, the number of areas falling within 
the exclusive remit of the legislature increased 
significantly, whilst the role of the opposition 
was also reinforced. It is also important to 
highlight that the judiciary has been elevated 
from a mere “authority” (as defined under the 
1996 Constitution) to the status of a full-blown 
branch of the State, independent of the 
legislature and the executive. As will be shown 
below, this independence is guaranteed 
principally through the Higher Council of the 
Judicial Power, the functions of which have 
been expanded. 
 
Other relevant democratic novelties 
introduced by the new Constitution include 
the territorial organisation of the State – now 
defined as “decentralised” and “based on an 
advanced regionalization system” (Article 1) – 
and the fight against corruption, which is 
undoubtedly one of the main scourges of 
Moroccan society. In this regard, particular 
note should be afforded to the provision of 
institutions to oversee good governance and 
regulatory matters, such as the High Authority 
for Audiovisual Communication, the 
Competition Council, the National Authority 
for Probity and the Prevention and Combat of 
Corruption. 
 
4.2. …and Continuity 
 
                                               
45 A. Harsi (2012), “Séparation et équilibre des pouvoirs 
dans la nouvelle Constitution de 2011”, in A. Bouachik, 
M. Degoffe, C. Saint-Prot (eds.), op. cit., p. 55. 
46 This practice had already been followed on two 
occasions (following the 1998 and 2007 elections), 
although since it had no constitutional status it could be 
disregarded at any time, as occurred after the 2002 
election. 
First and foremost it is important to stress that 
Morocco, despite what is stated in Article 1 of 
the Constitution,47 did not turn into a 
parliamentary monarchy based on the British 
or the Spanish model, where “the King reigns 
but does not govern.” Indeed, the Sovereign 
continues to be the key figure in determining 
political direction and adopting decisions of 
strategic importance for the country. The 
Sovereign continues to chair the Council of 
Ministers, the body that resolves matters of 
decisive interest for the State.48 Moreover, 
after consultation with the head of 
Government, the King can dismiss ministers 
(Article 47) and has the power to dissolve the 
Houses of Parliament (after consultation with 
the President of the Constitutional Court and 
after informing the presidents of the two 
Houses of Parliament and the head of 
Government) (Article 96). The Sovereign also 
continues in his role as president of the Higher 
Council of the Judicial Power (Article 56), 
supreme commander of the Royal Armed 
Forces (Article 53), and is also required to 
chair a new national security body, namely the 
Supreme Security Council, defined under 
Article 54 as the “forum for consultation on 
strategies regarding the internal and external 
security of the country, and for the 
management of crisis situations.”  
 
Undoubtedly, the most important innovation 
(at the very least, in formal terms) introduced 
by the new Constitution results from the fact 
that Article 19 of the previous constitutions 
(which granted the King practically unlimited 
powers)49 has been “split” into Articles 41 and 
42. The intention was to separate spiritual 
power from temporal power in order to 
                                               
47 Article 1 defines the Monarchy not only as 
“constitutional,” “democratic” and “social,” but also as 
“parliamentary.” 
48 Such as strategic orientations of State policy; any 
proposed revisions of the Constitution; drafting organic 
laws and framework laws; the general guidelines of the 
finance bill; drafting amnesty law; drafting texts related 
to the military domain; the declaration of a state of siege 
and of war; and appointments to high public office 
(Article 49). 
49 See section 2. 
 remedy the “confusion of powers” resulting 
from the provisions of the previous 
Constitution. Article 41 in particular sets forth 
the King’s prerogatives in the religious sphere, 
stipulating that as the “Commander of the 
Faithful” he shall ensure respect for Islam, 
shall be a guarantor of freedom of worship 
and shall preside over the High Council of 
Ulemas, which is the only body empowered to 
issue officially approved religious opinions 
(fatwas).  
 
Article 42 states that the King, as “Head of 
State, Supreme Representative, symbol of the 
unity of the nation, guarantor of the 
permanence and continuity of the State and 
supreme arbitrator between institutions, shall 
ensure compliance with the Constitution, the 
proper functioning of constitutional 
institutions, protection of the nation’s 
democratic options and of the rights and 
freedoms of citizens and communities, as well 
as compliance with the international 
commitments of the Kingdom. He shall be a 
guarantor of the independence of the country 
and of the territorial integrity of the Kingdom, 
within its authentic borders.” From a symbolic 
point of view, the reform of the old Article 19 
is a true revolution. For the first time in 50 
years, the most important provision of the 
Moroccan Constitution has been changed, 
thus losing its “sacredness.” As highlighted by 
the literature, however, it is far from certain 
that this “split” will bring about significant 
novelties from a practical point of view.50  
 
In addition, Article 42 goes on to specify that 
the Sovereign shall exercise his powers 
through royal decrees (dahirs), which must be 
countersigned by the head of Government. It 
should be stressed that whilst the dahirs that 
do not require countersignature by the head 
of Government are now the exception, they 
do relate to matters of particular importance: 
in addition to the appointment of the head of 
Government (Article 47), they cover the 
religious prerogatives inherent in the 
                                               
50 See D. Melloni (2012), Le nouvel ordre 
constitutionnel marocain: de la “monarchie 
gouvernante” à la “monarchie parlementaire”? in 
Centre d’Études Internationales (eds.), op. cit., p. 40. 
institution of the Commandership of the 
Faithful (Article 41), the appointment of the 
ten members of the Regency Council (Article 
44), the dissolution of Parliament (Article 51), 
the approval of appointments of magistrates 
by the Higher Council of the Judicial Power 
(Article 57), the proclamation of a state of 
emergency (Article 59), the appointment of 
half of the members of the Constitutional 
Court (Article 130), and the presentation of 
proposed constitutional amendments for 
referendum (Article 174). This appears to be 
quite a busy schedule for a King pretending to 
reign in a parliamentary monarchy! 
 
 
5. A Slow Process of Implementation 
 
One of the principal challenges faced by 
Morocco now concerns the process – which 
will undoubtedly be very delicate – of effective 
implementation of the provisions of the 
Constitution. This process will imply the 
adoption of numerous ordinary and organic 
laws depending on the circumstances of each 
case. In order to speed up the implementation 
process, Article 86 stipulates that the organic 
laws provided under the new Constitution 
must be presented to Parliament for approval 
before the end of the first legislature. Whilst it 
is significant, this provision does not appear to 
be conclusive, and it has certainly not been 
drafted in exceptionally precise terms. In fact, 
as stressed by Cesare Pinelli, Article 86 does 
not require Parliament to approve organic 
laws during the first legislature, but is limited 
to stipulating the duty to submit such laws to 
Parliament before the deadline specified. 
Moreover, the provision does not assert the 
consequences of the failure to comply with 
that time limit.51 It is certain that the 
implementation of the constitutional 
provisions is “one of the decisive factors in 
measuring the sincerity of the ambitious 
                                               
51 C. Pinelli (2012), “La démocratisation par voie 
législative après la transition à la démocratie”. 
Commission de Venise – Association internationale de 
droit constitutionnel, Processus constitutionnels et 
processus démocratiques: les expériences et les 
perspectives, Marrakech, 29-30 March, p. 6, 
http://www.venice.coe.int/files/2012_03_29_MAR/Prese
ntation_Pinelli.pdf 
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innovations introduced by the 2011 
Constitution.”52 
 
When addressing the Houses of Parliament on 
12 October 2012 and 11 October 2013 during 
the first parliamentary sessions, Mohammed 
VI urged Parliament to speed up the process 
of implementing the Constitution.53 In fact, on 
both occasions, the Sovereign invited 
Parliament to give full effect to the 
Constitution, particularly in the following 
areas: advancing Morocco’s regionalisation 
initiative, ensuring the independence of the 
judiciary, recognising the official character of 
the Amazigh language, and promoting the 
practice and institutions of good governance.  
 
More than two years after the promulgation of the 
Constitution, one cannot fail to notice that the process 
of implementation is proceeding at a rather slow pace. 
Up to the time of writing, Organic laws implementing 
the Constitution have only been enacted in relation to 
the Chamber of Representatives (no. 27/11), the 
Chamber of Councillors (no. 28/11), political parties (no. 
29/11), the election of the members of local 
government bodies (no. 59/11),54 and appointment to 
high office within the public administration in 
accordance with Articles 49 and 92 of the Constitution 
(no. 02/12). It must be pointed out that the most 
“delicate” constitutional provisions, representing the 
real novelty compared to the previous Constitution, 
have not yet been implemented: these include the 
provision recognising Amazigh as an official language, 
the provisions on the independence and autonomy of 
the judiciary, the provisions on the process of 
“advanced regionalisation,” the provisions in the field of 
good governance, the provisions on the organisation 
and functioning of the Constitutional Court, as well as 
the regulation of concrete constitutional review.  
                                               
52 Ibid., p. 5. 
53 It is important not to underestimate the fact that the 
presidency of the opening of the first session of 
Parliament, which is reserved under Article 65 of the 
Constitution to the Sovereign, allows the King the 
opportunity to provide inspiration for and to guide 
legislative action. To a certain extent, this speech given 
by the Monarch has some analogies with the “message 
on the state of the Union” delivered by the President of 
the United States. 
54 In relation to these four organic laws, see the 
commentary by M. Abdelaziz Lamghari (2012), 
Développements constitutionnels récents au Maroc 
(juillet – décembre 2011), 2 February, 
http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2012/CDL(2012)002-
f.pdf 
 
5.1. Ordinary Legislation vs. the Constitution 
and International Human Rights Treaties 
 
The issue of constitutional implementation has 
also been stressed by the Human Rights 
Watch 2013 World Report, according to which 
the “human rights conditions were decidedly 
mixed in Morocco, as a 2011 constitution 
containing strong human rights provisions did 
not translate into improved practices.”55 The 
situation is such that constitutional provisions 
that grant rights and freedoms are often not 
implemented or they are even denied by 
ordinary legislation. The 1962 Criminal Code 
contains a number of provisions at odds with 
the 2011 Constitution, as well as with 
international human rights treaties. Article 
475, for example, provides for a prison term 
from one to five years for a person who 
“abducts or deceives” a minor, but prevents 
the prosecutor from charging him if he then 
marries the minor. According to rights activists 
in Morocco, courts have applied Article 475 in 
rape cases, thus allowing rapists to escape 
prosecution.56 Another example is given by 
Article 496, which criminalises the harbouring 
of a married woman who leaves her husband. 
The Criminal Code also prohibits apostasy (Art. 
220), the ostentatious break of fast in a public 
space during Ramadan (Art. 222), homosexual 
relations (Art. 489), as well as sexual relations 
between individuals of opposite sexes who are 
not religiously married (Art. 490).57  
 
                                               
55 Human Rights Watch 2013 World Report, p. 588, 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/wr2013_web.pdf 
56 See Human Rights Watch 2013 World Report, cit., p. 
591. 
57 In relation to these issues, see F. Alicino (2013), “La 
libertà religiosa nella nuova Costituzione del Marocco”. 
Rivista telematica dell’associazione italiana dei 
costituzionalisti, no. 4, 
http://www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it/sites/defau
lt/files/rivista/articoli/allegati/4_2013_Alicino.pdf; H. 
Souktani (2012), “Le code pénal et le nouvel 
engagement international du Maroc”. Revue marocaine 
d’administration locale et de développement, no. 107, p. 
133 ff.  
 Even the Code of Criminal Procedure fails to 
comply in some cases with the provisions 
stated in the 2011 Constitution and in 
international human rights treaties.58 Article 
290, for example, states that “the records and 
reports prepared by officers of the judicial 
police in regard to determining 
misdemeanours and infractions are to be 
deemed trustworthy unless the contrary is 
proven in accordance with the rules of 
evidence.” In a June 2013 report on the flaws 
of the Moroccan judicial system,59 Human 
Rights Watch stressed the fact that courts 
often quote this rule in written verdicts where 
they decide to convict defendants based on 
incriminating statements made to police, even 
if the defendants allege their statements were 
obtained through torture or ill-treatment. 
Human Rights Watch has rightly pointed out 
the need to amend the Code of Criminal 
Procedure “to indicate that where there is an 
allegation of torture or ill treatment, the 
burden of proof lies on the prosecution to 
prove that any confession made has not been 
obtained by unlawful means.”60 Therefore, as 
often happens in non-democracies or in 
countries transitioning from authoritarian 
rule,61 “old” ordinary legislation needs to be 
                                               
58 Human Rights Watch (2004), Morocco: Human 
Rights at a Crossroads, October, 
http://www.hrw.org/print/reports/2004/10/20/morocco-
human-rights-crossroads 
59 In particular, the report analyses some politically 
sensitive cases adjudicated between 2008 and 2013, 
where the courts violated the right of defendants to a fair 
trial (Human Rights Watch (2013), “Just Sign Here”: 
Unfair Trials Based on Confessions to the Police in 
Morocco, June, 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/morocco0
613webwcover.pdf) 
60 Human Rights Watch (2013), “Just Sign Here”: 
Unfair Trials Based on Confessions to the Police in 
Morocco, cit., p. 6. 
61 For example, in Italy, for many years after the entry 
into force of the 1948 Constitution, instead of the 
constitutional provisions, several statutes from the 
fascist period that were in contrast with the Constitution 
were enforced – the most important being the 1931 
Unified Code on Public Security, the 1930 Code of 
Criminal Procedure and the 1930 Criminal Code. The 
Constitutional Court, set up in 1956, played a pivotal 
role in eliminating the Fascist legislation that still 
limited civil, political, religious and social rights and 
freedoms (see E. Cheli (1996), Il giudice delle leggi. 
Bologna: il Mulino). 
brought in line with the new Constitution and 
with international human rights treaties. 
 
5.2. The Role of the Judiciary and the 
Constitutional Court 
 
It is important to stress that the 
implementation of the new Constitution 
depends not only on the King, the 
Government and the Parliament, but also on 
other actors such as the judges and the 
Constitutional Court. For this reason, the 
constitutional provisions in the field of judicial 
independence and constitutional adjudication 
ought to be implemented as soon as possible.  
 
Significant novelties have been conferred to 
the Higher Council of Judicial Power. This 
body, which replaces the High Council of 
Magistracy, is still chaired by the King; 
however, under the new Constitution, the 
executive president is not the Minister of 
Justice (as provided under the 1996 
Constitution) but is the first president of the 
Court of Cassation, thus making this body 
more independent (Article 115). The Council 
can draw up reports on the status of justice 
and the judiciary, and make recommendations 
in this field (Article 113). It is important to 
stress that now “individual decisions by the 
Council […] may be challenged before the 
highest administrative jurisdiction in the 
Kingdom [i.e., the Administrative Chamber of 
the Supreme Court], on the grounds of abuse 
of powers” (Article 114). This form of appeal 
seems to depart from the tradition of 
immunity to royal dahirs. However, as has 
been stressed in the literature,62 these are not 
genuine royal dahirs, but decisions made by 
the Higher Council of Judicial Power, which is 
chaired by the King. 
 
On 8 May 2012, Mohammed VI established 
the “High Authority for national dialogue on 
the reform of the justice system.” This body is 
charged with preparing reform proposals for 
                                               
62 Y. Gaudemet (2012), “Le pouvoir judiciaire dans la 
Constitution marocaine de 2011”. Centre d’Études 
Internationales (eds.), op. cit., p. 203; B. Mathieu 
(2013), “L’émergence du pouvoir judiciaire dans la 
Constitution marocaine de 2011”. Pouvoir, 145, p. 57. 
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the judicial system in the light of the 
provisions contained in Title VII of the 
Constitution, which is dedicated to the 
judiciary. In September 2013, the High 
Authority presented the results of its work, 
consisting of a “Charter on the Reform of the 
Judiciary System.”63 This charter is a long 
document containing a number of proposals 
aimed at implementing the constitutional 
provisions in the field of judicial 
independence, strengthening the judicial 
protection of fundamental rights, and 
improving judicial procedures. The Charter 
also recommends the amendment of the 
Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal 
Procedure in order to meet the democratic 
standards provided in the 2011 Constitution 
and in international human rights treaties. This 
document undoubtedly represents an 
important step, and the proposals contained 
therein should be turned into law as soon as 
possible. 
 
The 2011 Constitution also introduced 
significant novelties in the field of 
constitutional adjudication. The new 
Constitutional Court, which replaces the 
Constitutional Council provided in the 1996 
Constitution, will be made up of twelve 
members: six will be appointed by the King 
(who also appoints the President), and the 
other six will be appointed by the House of 
Representatives and the House of Councillors 
(Article 130). This body, besides deciding on 
the validity of the election of the members of 
Parliament and the organization of 
referendums, has to make sure that organic 
laws, ordinary laws and regulations of both 
Houses of Parliament are not in conflict with 
the Constitution (Article 132). Moreover, 
Article 55 states that when “the Constitutional 
Court […] declare[s] that an international 
commitment involves a provision which is 
inconsistent with the Constitution, the said 
                                               
63 The Charter is available at 
http://www.justice.gov.ma/App_Themes/ar/img/Files/Ch
arte_Reforme_JusticeFr.pdf 
text may not be ratified until the Constitution 
has been revised.”  
 
It is important to stress that in addition to the 
ex ante review (already provided for under the 
previous Constitution), the new Constitution 
introduced the concrete constitutional review. 
In fact, Article 133 provides that “the 
Constitutional Court shall have competence to 
look into an exception of unconstitutionality 
raised in the course of a trial, when one of the 
parties argues that the law on which depends 
the outcome of a trial undermines the rights 
and freedoms guaranteed by the 
Constitution.” The introduction of such ex post 
review thus appears to be extremely 
important in order to enable the 
Constitutional Court to reinforce its position as 
a counter-majoritarian body and may thus 
contribute to the process of democratisation 
in a more effective manner than in the past.64 
Indeed, the previous Constitutional Council 
has not “fulfilled the expectations in the field 
of protection of fundamental rights.”65 This is 
due to the fact that the parliamentary 
opposition has appealed to the Council only in 
a very limited number of cases, in spite of the 
fact that in many instances the 
constitutionality of a whole series of laws was 
more than doubtful.66 Precisely for this 
reason, in the field of constitutional review the 
Constitutional Council has been compared to 
the “sleeping beauty castle.”67  
 
                                               
64 For example, it may increase the chances that the 
Constitutional Court will rule on the constitutionality of 
the aforementioned articles of the Criminal Code and 
Code of Criminal Procedure.  
65 I. Gallala-Arndt (2012), “Constitutional Jurisdiction 
and Its Limits in the Maghreb.” Constitutionalism in 
Islamic Countries. Between Upheaval and Continuity, R. 
Grote and T.J. Röder (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p. 254.  
66 See I. Gallala-Arndt (2012), op. cit., pp. 254-55.    
67 This was the metaphor used by Robert Badinter, cited 
by N. Bernoussi (2012), “La Constitution de 2011 et le 
juge constitutionnel”, in Centre d’Études Internationales 
(eds.), op. cit., p. 211. On the contrary, the Council has 
been very active in the field of electoral justice. 
 However, it should be noted that the organic 
laws regulating the organisation and 
functioning of the Higher Council of the 
Judicial Power and of the Constitutional Court, 
as well as the regulation of concrete 
constitutional review, have not yet been 
adopted. Therefore, as provided for by Articles 
177 and 178 of the Constitution, the High 
Council of Magistracy and the Constitutional 
Council will continue to carry out their 
functions until the new bodies have been set 
up. 
 
As underlined by Nadia Bernoussi, it remains 
to be seen how constitutional judges will 
interpret a series of provisions that may be 
read in diametrically opposed terms.68  
Consider, for example, the priority of 
international conventions over national law. 
What will the judges decide when, for 
example, the law on succession is challenged 
on the grounds that it is considered to breach 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 
and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights? Will they implement the 
international conventions, basing their 
arguments on the superiority of the latter over 
the law, and on the interpretation of an open 
and moderate Islam (in accordance with the 
Preamble and Article 1 of the Constitution) 
and the principle of non-discrimination? Or 
will the law be implemented on the grounds 
that the constitution enshrines the superiority 
of international conventions, but “within the 
framework of the provisions of the 
Constitution, the laws of the Kingdom, and 
respect for its immutable national identity” 
(emphasis added)?69  
 
Similar questions arise in relation to Article 19 
of the Constitution, which subjects the 
principle of equal rights for men and women 
to comply with the “provisions of the 
Constitution and […] the immutable values 
and the laws of the Realm” (emphasis added). 
When interpreting that article, the judges may 
base their reasoning on the reference by the 
Constitution to “universally recognised” 
                                               
68 N. Bernoussi (2012), op. cit., pp. 225-26.  
69  Ibid., p. 226. 
human rights and the values of open and 
moderate Islam or, alternatively, give greater 
emphasis to the “immutable values and the 
laws of the Realm” – which, as noted above, 
are also expressly enshrined within the 
Constitution.70  
Accordingly, the interpretative option appears 
to be between “ijtihad” on the one hand and 
“taqlid” on the other. Indeed, the former 
refers to “the hermeneutic effort, the 
independent interpretative reasoning of the 
lawyer aiming at extrapolating or highlighting 
by analogy a new legal rule from the sources 
of law,” while the latter consists of “the 
faithful compliance with doctrines previously 
developed by the principal mugtahid lawyers 
which, during the initial formative period, 
operated within the individual law schools.”71  
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
Contrary to what has been stated by some 
prominent Western political leaders, the 
representatives of the European Union 
institutions, the mainstream media and even a 
section of the literature, the analysis of the 
2011 constitutional reform reveals more flaws 
than merits.72 Indeed, on the one hand, the 
constitutional process became more 
democratic compared with the past, and the 
Constitution introduced some relevant 
democratic novelties. However, on the other 
hand, the Constitution is still a “grant” of the 
Sovereign and did not result from a 
democratically elected constituent assembly – 
not to mention the fact that the separation of 
powers is more theoretical than substantive 
                                               
70  Ibid., p. 225. 
71 G. Piccinelli (1999), “La dimensione etica del diritto 
musulmano classico e contemporaneo”. Roma e America 
Latina, VII. 
72 There appear to be three possible explanations why 
the constitutional reform process has received much 
praise. First, the analysis of the process has been 
conducted superficially. Second, the image of himself 
that Mohammed VI managed to transmit abroad (i.e., a 
reformer who intends to improve living conditions for 
the poor and downtrodden, and who wants to create a 
country based on the rule of law) is still strong in the 
Western world. Third, good allies of Morocco, such us 
France and the United States, often prefer to turn a blind 
eye to democratic deficits of the country for reasons of 
realpolitik. 
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and the King continues to hold near absolute 
powers. Additionally, the process of 
implementation is proceeding quite slowly and 
ordinary legislation in some cases is in sharp 
contrast with the Constitution and with 
international human rights treaties.  
 
Evidently, the main reason that the 
constitutional reform has been coloured by 
these major democratic deficits is strictly 
linked to the role played by Mohammed VI. 
Indeed, on the one hand it is true that thanks 
to the reforms introduced by the King since 
the beginning of his reign (such as the Family 
Code and the establishment of the Equity and 
Reconciliation Commission),73 Morocco has 
ceased to be an autocratic regime (as it was 
under Hassan II). However, on the other hand, 
Mohammed VI turned the country into a 
hybrid regime, although not a democracy.74 
The impression is that the 2011 Constitution 
mainly responded to the need to appease 
people’s discontent so as to ensure the 
regime’s stability and continuity. The 
Moroccan King allowed the constitutional 
reform to take place as long as his key powers 
and prerogatives were not questioned. It 
appears from the analysis summarised in this 
paper that his main purpose was not to 
democratise the country, but to guarantee his 
own survival.  
 
It is accepted that Mohammed VI has (so far) 
achieved his aim: the Moroccan Monarchy 
continues to be an executive Monarchy, and 
the country remains a hybrid regime. At the 
same time, however, the 2011 Constitution 
has in some of its parts great potential that 
should not be wasted. Therefore, all efforts 
should now be concentrated on the 
                                               
73 The 2004 Family Code (Moudawana) entailed a 
tangible improvement in conditions for women. The 
2004 Equity and Reconciliation Commission (the first 
Truth Commission to be created in the Arab world) was 
requested to investigate cases of “disappearances” and 
arbitrary imprisonment between 1956 (the year in which 
the country gained independence) and 1999 (the year in 
which Hassan II died). 
74  F. Biagi (2012), op. cit., p. 403 ff. 
implementation of the most innovative parts 
of the Constitution, particularly those related 
to the independence of the judiciary, 
constitutional review, territorial 
decentralisation, Amazigh as an official State 
language and good governance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
